Michigan Law Review
Volume 51

Issue 1

1952

LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION-APPLICABILITY OF THE UNITED
STATES ARBITRATION ACT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS
Morris G. Shanker S. Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Morris G. Shanker S. Ed., LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION-APPLICABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES
ARBITRATION ACT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, 51 MICH. L. REV. 117 (1952).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol51/iss1/15

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1952]

R.EcENT DECISIONS

117

UNITED STATES .ArouACT TO CoLLECTIVB BARGAINING AGIUIBMENTs-Plaintiff brought an
action in the federal district court for Pennsylvania against the defendant labor
union for damages taused by a strike, allegedly in violation of a written collective bargaining agreement between them. This contract also provided, inter alia,
for submission to arbitration of all differences arising between the parties under
the contract. However, no arbitration had been had prior to this suit. Defendant moved to stay all proceedings pending arbitration, allegedly as authorized
by section 3 of the United States .Arbitration .Act1 providing for such stays in
".•. any suit or proceeding ••• brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration •••." Plaintiff urged that these
words were limited by section I, the definition section of the act,2 which contained a clause that ". • . nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment •.••"3 The district court sustained defendant's arguments
and further pointed out that even if section I were applicable to section 3, it was
LmoR LAw-furaITRATION-fuPLICABILITY oF THB

TRATION

161 Stat. L. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1951) §1 et seq. This act was
originally passed in 1925, 43 Stat. L. 883 (1925), and re-enacted in 1947. Its purpose
was to change the common law, which would not specifically enforce an agreement to
arbitrate. The common law rule is discussed in 43 ILL. L. Rnv. 678 (1948), and GmsMORB, PRINCIPLES oP THE LAw oP CoNTBAcrs 510 (1947).
2 Ibid.
8 Other pertinent provisions of the Arbitration Act are as follows: Section 2 makes
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" a written agreement to arbitrate any "maritime transaction or • • • contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.
" Section 4
provides for the specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate.
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doubtful that a collective bargaining agreement was a "contract of employment"
for purposes of exclusion from the act.4 On appeal, held, reversed. Contracts
of employment, which include collective bargaining agreements, are excluded
from the operation of the entire Arbitration Act. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc. v. Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway, & Motor Coach
Employees of America, Division 1063, (3d Cir. 1952) 193 F. (2d) 327.
Prior to this decision, the circuit courts of appeals were divided on the
question whether the "contracts of employment" exclusion of section 1 of the
United States Arbitration Act limited section 3 of the act providing for stays
pending arbitration in "any suit or proceeding" brought in a federal court.11
[Emphasis added]. The Fourth,6 Sixth,7 and Tenth Circuits8 had recognized
such a limitation, while the Third Circuit alone did not.9 This latter court
had reasoned that section 3 governed procedure applicable in the federal courts
and accordingly was not in any manner restricted by the definitions and
exclusions found in section 1. Thus, courts in the Third Circuit were willing
indirectly to enforce all written agreements to arbitrate by the method of
staying judicial proceedings pending such arbitration in any suit where the
federal courts could gain jurisdiction over the matter.10 By the principal case,
the Third Circuit, relying on certain headnote changes in section 1 made in
the re-enactment of the Arbitration Act in 1947,11 now admits that these
arguments were erroneous and were a misconstruction of the true intent of
Congress wholly to exclude contracts of employment from the operation of
4 (D.C. Pa. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 789. The statement of facts here given is condensed
from this district court decision.
5 On this general problem, see 28 N.C.L. REv. 225 (1950); 4 Aim. J. 39 (1940).
6 International Union United Furniture Workers of America et al. v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., (4th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 33. Cf. Agostini Brothers Building Corp.
v. United States, (4th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 854, discussed infra note 10.
7 Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, (6th Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 876.
8 Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers' International Union, C.I.O., (10th Cir.
1951) 187 F. (2d) 980.
9 Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., (3d Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 3; Watkins
v. Hudson Coal Co., (3d Cir. 1945) 151 F. (2d) 311, cert. den. 327 U.S. 777, 66 S. Ct.
522 (1946), rehearing den. 327 U.S. 816, 66 S. Ct. 701 (1946); Jones v. Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Co., (D.C. Pa. 1951) 98 F. Supp. 787.
10 The Supreme Court and other circuit courts of appeals have not yet passed on the
precise question presented here. However, the Second Circuit has held that the stay
provisions of §3 are not limited to those cases which can be specifically enforced under
§4 of the act, supra note 3; Shanferoke Coal and Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service
Corp., (2d Cir. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 297, affd. 293 U.S. 449, 55 S. Ct. 313 (1935); while
the Fourth Circuit has held that §3 was not limited to the class of cases enumerated in §2
of the act, supra note 3; Agostini Brothers Building Corp. v. United States, supra note 6.
To this same effect and containing an excellent discussion of the various cases pertaining
to this problem is Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., (D.C. Neb. 1948) 77 F.
Supp. 364, affd. (8th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 57. Cf. Shirley-Herman Co. v. International
Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborer's Union of America, Local No. 210, (2d Cir.
1950) 182 F. (2d) 806, dealing with the applicability of the Arbitration Act to suits
brought under §301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV, 1951) §185.
11 See note 1 supra. In the re-enactment, Congress added these words to the heading
of §1: "exceptions to operation of title" [Emphasis added].
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the entire act.12 Further, this decision joins the trend of other circuit courts
of appeals in rejecting the contention that Congress intended to distinguish
collective bargaining agreements from other contracts of employment for
purposes of exclusion from the Arbitration Act.13
It now seems clear that there is no method under existing federal legislation
to enforce, directly or indirectly, an agreement to arbitrate contained in a
collective bargaining agreement. No doubt, this result is dictated by the technical
rules of statutory construction, 14 the legislative history,15 and context applicable
to the Arbitration Act.16 Yet, such a result seems completely antithetical to an
apparently accepted national policy in favor of promoting industrial peace
through the use of arbitration to settle disputes between labor and management.17
Accordingly, it would seem that congressional action specifically rectifying this
anomaly would be desirable.
Morris G. Shanker, S.Ed.

12 Actually, these views were first announced by the Third Circuit in Amalgamated
Association, etc. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., (3d Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 310,
on which the principal case relies.
1 8 See for example, Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, supra note 7. This distinction was first
recognized in analogous state court decisions: Levy v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. (2d) 692,
104 P. (2d) 770 (1940), and cases collected at 129 A.L.R. 965 (1940). Only recently
has it been suggested and upheld by the federal district courts: Lewittes & Sons v. United
Furniture Workers of America, (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 851. Dictum in the
Supreme Court case of J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332,
64 S. Ct. 576 (1944), supports this distinction; however, the Third Circuit has distinguished this case from those similar to the principal case on their facts: Amalgamated Association, etc., v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra note 12.
14 See dissent in Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., supra note 9.
15 The Arbitration Act was presented primarily as a measure to regulate commercial
contracts. No mention is made in the congressional debates of the impact of the act on
collective bargaining agreements. See 28 N.C. L. fuv. 225 (1950).
10 See Amalgamated Association, etc., v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra
note 12.
17 See Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborer's Union of America, supra note 10.

